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The analysis compares voters’ preferences in economic policy to political parties’ economic written parliamentary questions 
during the 2009–2014 term of the European Parliament. The corpus of over 55,000 written questions was ideologically scaled via 
crowdsourcing. The analysis shows that parties are unresponsive to second-order and to disengaged voters. The results also 
suggest that there is no upper class bias in European Parliament political representation. The data highlight a strong tendency of 
EP7 political parties to cluster around the position of the average European voter, at the expense of their average supporter. The 
democratic deficit is therefore at most a pluralism deficit in the European Parliament, since substantive representation in the 











Miriam Sorace, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street,  




Forty-seven per cent of Europeans surveyed in the 2014 European Election Study believed the European Parliament 
(EP) did not represent their preferences, and 44% claimed not to trust the institutions of the European Union 
(Schmitt et al., 2015). Popular support for the European Union has decreased since the 1990s, when the age of 
‘permissive consensus’ ended, following the establishment of the internal market (Hix 2008). On top of this, on 23 
June 2016 British voters decided that the UK should exit the EU, amid, among other things, perceptions of not being 
represented by EU policymakers. UK voters are determined to ‘take back control’ from a distant and 
unrepresentative European polity, as maintained by the Leave campaigners. 
  
Far from being confined to Euro-sceptic rhetoric, concerns about the EU demo-cratic deficit first appeared in 
academic circles (Leconte, 2010). The academic cri-tiques levelled at the EU fall into six general categories: (1) the 
EU has an opaque institutional design and ends up being dominated by technocrats, (2) the EU has led to 
‘deparliamentarisation’, (3) the EP does not have suﬃcient influence, (4) there is no European ‘demos’ and hence no 
European democracy is possible, (5) EU elections are ‘second-order’: they do not convey suﬃcient information to 
European voters or make it possible to hold legislators to account and (6) the EU does not represent its citizens 
because of its pro-capital bias. The aim of this article is to investigate the latter academic democratic deficit 
hypotheses by using legislative activities of the EP as a case.  
Assessing political acts against voters’ political preferences is the essential test of democracy (Gilens, 2005; May, 
1978; Pitkin, 1967), and yet – though the notion that the EU is not democratic is voiced by Euro-sceptics and 
academics alike – not many studies examine the adherence to the ‘responsive rule’ by representatives serving in EU 
institutions. The existing scholarship on the health of EU political representation overly relies on ‘formalistic 
representation’ (Pitkin, 1967), since it tests the quality of the ‘authorisation’ process by examining the match 
between voters’ attitudes and representatives attitudes or promises at election time (Belchior, 2013; Costello et al., 
2012; Dalton, 2015; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann, 2013; Walczak and Van der Brug, 2013). Existing research that 
looks at ‘substantive’ representation (the match between voter attitudes and representative behaviours) does not 
place EU legislation on the left–right spectrum. This literature tests sub-stantive representation of Euro-scepticism, 
not of voters’ left–right preferences (Arnold et al., 2013; Hagemann et al., 2016; Toshkov, 2011). 
 
No studies to date examine the left–right behaviours of EU representatives against the left–right preferences of 
citizens. Behavioural congruence is diﬀerent from ideological or attitudinal congruence, and it is closer to Pitkin’s 
conceptual-isation of political representation as ‘substantive’ or ‘acting for’ representation (Eulau and Karps, 1977). 
Substantive representation is a synonym of responsiveness (Eulau and Karps, 1977; May, 1978), even though more 
recent empirical scholarship restricts the concept of responsiveness to time series designs. Behavioural congruence 
indicates the congruence between voters’ left–right atti-tudes with parties’ left–right statements during their 
decision-making activities and is here a synonym for substantive representation. 
 
This article investigates the role of voters’ characteristics for political represen-tation in the EP. In particular, the 
analysis focuses on the role of second-order voting and social class, testing the ‘political contestation’ and the 
‘social-demo-cratic’ critiques to the EU democratic deficit. These two hypotheses are significant not only because 
they address key academic concerns over the EU democratic deficit, but also because they reflect the wider 
theoretical debate on representative democracy. The broader literature on political representation examines represen-
tative performances either through participatory models of democracy or through political agency models. Both can 
be linked to the political contestation and the social democratic critiques of the EU democratic deficit.  
Participatory models of democracy are connected to Marx’s view on democracy, as they emphasise the 
detrimental role of socio-economic structures, which lead to the ‘bourgeois bias’ of representative institutions (Held, 
2006). Participatory models support a conceptualisation of political representation as ‘presentation’ (Pitkin, 1967) 
and reforms introducing deliberative, participatory and descriptive representation elements to representative 
institutions (Held, 2006). The social-democratic hypothesis on the EU democratic deficit is connected to this model 
of democracy. It argues that a democratic deficit exists in the Union because EU group politics is dominated by 
business lobbies, and because EU competences are confined to ‘market creation’ policies, which lead to the interests 
of the lower classes to be suppressed in the process. A participatory understanding of democracy would imply that 
political representation would fail whenever a particular demographic group is under-represented in political 
institutions. Therefore, since in most representative democracies the elite is composed of middle and upper class 
individuals – and the EP is no exception (Corbett et al., 2011) – the interests of the lower classes are expected to 
receive inferior representation. 
 
Political agency models are associated with rational choice theory and emphasise the crucial role of political 
information instead (Downs, 1957). Representative democracies are understood, in this framework, as delegation 
regimes (Besley, 2006). The agency problems entailed by delegation relationships are, however, not inexorable, in 
this view. Representation can work when proper information is available to allow for both correct selection and 
attribution of rewards/sanctions. The political contestation critique can be linked to this model of democracy since it 
argues that a democratic deficit exists in the Union because voters in European elections are poorly informed on EU 
policies and agenda and cannot properly select or monitor EU representatives. A political agency understanding of 
democracy, therefore, anticipates that political representation fails voters that are unwilling or unable to gather the 
relevant information on European party platforms and/ or to monitor parties while in oﬃce. 
To test these theories, the analysis assigns left–right ideological scores to political parties serving in the seventh 
term of the EP via crowd-sourced content analysis of their written parliamentary questions on economic policy. 
Next, party voters are placed in the economic left–right scale through an index of economic policy survey items in 
the European Election Study 2009 (Egmond et al., 2013). The diﬀerences between parties’ and voters’ ideological 
scales are first described via regression and distribution analysis. Second, the ‘behavioural congruence scores’ for 
each individual party in the sample are calculated, and then used to test the political contestation and the socio-
democratic hypotheses via a multilevel regression model. 
The EP was chosen as the case study because of the importance of EP performance for popular evaluations of EU 
democracy (Hobolt, 2012). In addition, it is fundamental to assess the representativeness of the ‘direct accountability 
channel’ of the EU (Norris, 1997). The focus on written parliamentary questions makes this study an assessment of 
substantive representations in ‘inputs’ to the system. Some scholars have argued that it is vital to assess 
representative democracy during ‘processes’ or ‘inputs’. For the majoritarian outputs of representative democracies 
to be accepted as legitimate, in fact, voters need to know their policy preferences managed at the very least to access 
the policymaking stage, and that, therefore there is pluralism during the agenda setting and deliberative stages 
(Bellamy, 2010; Dahl, 1989; Goodin, 2003). This study investigates the representativeness and pluralism of inputs to 
the EU decision-making process. 
The results document that the EP has majoritarian tendencies even in ‘less con-sequential’ legislative activities, 
typical of the ‘input stages’ of the policy cycle, such as written parliamentary questions. Parties serving in the EP 
sacrifice the pluralistic representation of their average supporter to coalesce around the policy preferences of the 
average European voter. In addition to this, the data show that second-order voting and low engagement with the 
electoral campaign hurt voters. First-order voters, together with voters informed about and engaged in the 2009 EP 
election campaign, are in fact better represented than second-order and uninformed voters. Both the political agency 
model of democracy and the political contestation critique of EU democracy are vindicated by the data. In contrast, 
as far as the social-democratic critique is concerned, social class does not seem to matter for political representation 
in the EP. Curiously, it is the policy preferences of the middle and of the upper-middle classes that appear to be 
somewhat less represented than those of the working classes in parties’ written parliamentary questions. All other 
social classes are, however, equally well represented. A systematic bias in favour of the working classes is therefore 
not supported by the data either.  
The study makes several contributions. It enhances our understanding of the EU democratic deficit, it extends the 
literature on EP political representation and it weighs in major democratic theory debates, by establishing whether 
political representation fails because of information asymmetries or because of ‘structural’ inequalities. The findings 
also have practical implications for the survival of the EU political system: the quality of political representation 
matters for regime support and legitimacy (Newton, 2006; Rohrschneider, 2002). Low legitimacy of political 
institutions, in turn, leads to more anti-system political behaviour (such as fights with the police, unoﬃcial 
protesting, government overthrow and refusal to pay taxes) and higher tolerance for non-compliance with the law 
(Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Muller et al., 1982). Inadequate representation can thus have extreme consequences for 
the eﬀectiveness and survival of political systems: studies have highlighted the way in which Euro-scepticism has 
already transformed European institutions and practices, 
 
which have become increasingly intergovernmental (Leconte, 2010: Chapter 1). Low representation in inputs to 
decision-making may further fuel popular Euro-sceptic tendencies and reinforce Euro-sceptic campaigns, leading, in 




Political agency models describe the relationship between voters and representatives as a non-contractual repeated 
delegation game. The representative relationship is non-contractual since legislators’ independence is often 
enshrined in representative institutions’ rules of procedure, and since no third party exists that can formally sanction 
representatives or political parties for not following the ‘responsible party model’. The relationship is a repeated one 
since every legislator, and political party, has a probability d of being re-elected at time t+1 (Besley, 2006; Morrow, 
1994). Voters are assumed to primarily value the voicing of their ideological interests (Dahl, 1989) while 
representatives mostly value vote maximisation (Downs, 1957). These contrasting goals may motivate agents to drift 
if anything else besides voicing voters’ preferences can ensure either vote or oﬃce maximization. These contrasting 
goals may motivate agents to drift if anything else besides voicing voters’ preferences can ensure either vote or 
oﬃce maximization. Therefore, in political representation, principals (voters) move first and are potentially subject 
to agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazards. 
 
According to political agency models such problems can be counteracted by either correct selection, the 
narrowing of representatives’ discretion and/or through future rewards and punishments (Besley, 2006; Ferejohn, 
1986; Morrow, 1994; Perrson et al., 1997). The existence of a future can counter the agent’s temptation to defect, 
provided that the payoﬀ from future rewards and punishments is higher than the payoﬀ from shirking (Morrow, 
1994).  
The ‘political contestation critique’ of the EU democratic deficit precisely decries the scarcity and poor quality of 
the electoral information disseminated during elections to the EP and the weak sanctions available to European 
voters. Scholars argue that current EP electoral campaigns pre-empt the usage of the most traditional rewards and 
punishment available to voters in representative democracies. Voting behaviour in elections to the EP is second-
order, mostly focused on rewarding/punishing national government performance rather than on the assessment of 
EU-specific platforms and actions (Hix and Marsh, 2011). EP campaigns contain low substantive information on the 
EU policies and agenda (Davidson-Schmich and Vladescu, 2012), and voters are unaware of party position-ing 
during EP campaigns (McElroy and Kritzinger, 2012). Punishing Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for 
shirking is, as a consequence, very costly for the European voter, plagued by insuﬃcient information. This situation 
makes defections potentially less costly for politicians. Follesdal and Hix (2006) call the lack of political 
contestation over European issues in EU elections the major anti-democratic flaw of the EU, a flaw that even 
Moravcsik (2008), the staunchest abjurer of the democratic deficit, recognises as dangerous. The inadequacy of EP 
election campaigns is expected to make it virtually impossible for voters, and espe-cially for second-order and for 
uninformed voters, to accurately select and monitor EU representatives. This, in addition, calls into question whether 
European voters can have their policy preferences voiced in EU institutions. 
 
Three hypotheses are derived from political agency models of democracy and from the political contestation 
critique. The political agency model of democracy implies that variation in parties’ behavioural congruence should 
be associated with second-order voting, voter engagement with and attention to the EU campaign, or voter general 
knowledge about the EU. 
 
H1: EP7 political parties’ behavioural incongruence is higher for second-order voters, all else constant. 
 
H2: EP7 political parties’ behavioural incongruence is higher for voters with lower exposure to the EP election campaign, 
all else constant. 
 
H3: EP7 political parties’ behavioural incongruence is higher for voters with low EU knowledge, all else constant. 
 
If these types of voters are less represented by their parties, keeping all else constant, it must mean that political 
information and informed, non-protest voting matters in ensuring the behavioural congruence of representatives. 
This would vindicate the political agency model of democracy as well as the political contestation critique. 
 
The participatory model of democracy, and the social-democratic critique – its correlate in the democratic deficit 
literature – postulate that political parties, com-posed by members of the middle and upper classes and immersed in 
an environment tailored to elite and pro-business interests, will inevitably under-represent substantial sections of the 
population. This stance is tenaciously held by the members of the Italian Five Star Movement, members, together 
with Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party, of the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
party group in the EP. At the Five Star Movement founding rally, the V-day, representative democracy was 
described as a mechanism to cheat poor people (though they put it more ‘colourfully’ than that).
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 Their concerns 
over representative democracy are influenced by participatory models of democracy, Marxist theory and by the early 
20th-century works by Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto on oligarchies (Held, 2006; Morel, 
2012). Empirical evidence has demonstrated that the lower classes are seriously under-represented in the rank and 
file of representative institutions (Carnes and Lupu, 2016) and that representation inequalities favouring the upper 
classes are rampant in some representative democracies (Aaldering, 2016; Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2005; Gilens and 
Page, 2014). 
The ‘social-democratic critique’ of EU democracy predicts that the failure of political parties serving in EU 
institutions to represent voters is specifically going to be at the expense of the lower classes. The EU, according to 
these scholars, has a democratic deficit because it is, similarly to representative democracies in general, inherently 
biased towards pro-capital interests. In the words of Schmitter (2000: 9) ‘[t]he EU is indeed surrounded by 
representatives, but these are hardly representative of the citizenry as a whole. At the functional level, they are 
overwhelmingly skewed to favour business interests’. Schmitter (2000) and Streeck (1995) theorise that the 
constitutional structure of the EU necessarily leads to policies biased against the interests of wage earners, 
pensioners, the unemployed and the young. According to this view, national governments fought to maintain full 
constitutional legitimacy to pass social and welfare policies for themselves. As a result, the EU can, at most, concern 
itself with ‘market creation’ policies, i.e. deregulatory policies to allow the removal of market barriers, e.g. tariﬀs 
and/or barriers to movement of people and capital. In addition to this, Schmitter (2000) and Streeck (1995) argue, 
group politics in the EU is skewed towards business and professional lobbies. EU representatives, given the context 
they work in, are fundamentally incapacitated to channel non-upper class interests.  
The social-democratic critique hypothesises that specific social groups are sys-tematically better represented than 
others, because EU policymaking is naturally partial to the interests of the wealthy. This hypothesis will be tested by 
examining the relationship between parties’ behavioural incongruence and voters’ social class. 
 
H4: EP7 political parties’ behavioural incongruence is higher for voters from the lower classes, all else constant. 
 
Analysis: Scaling political parties and party voters 
 
Crowdsourcing of EP written questions is used to retrieve political parties’ positions in economic policy. The 
operationalisation imposed by a substantive conceptualisation of political representation requires text analysis of 
legislative activities. Estimating party scores via candidate or expert surveys was avoided as it corresponds more 
closely to the formalistic conceptualisation of political representation, in that it relies on manifestoes (electoral 
contracts), candidates’ answers to election surveys and parties’ oﬃcial/public stances. In addition, datasets on expert 
scoring of political parties are inappropriate for the objectives of this article in that they do not concentrate on EU 
legislative activities specifically.  
Crowdsourcing is a cheap and fully replicable text analysis technique that can be fruitfully exploited in studies of 
substantive representation. It is comparable to classic hand-coding procedures, such as the one adopted by the 
Comparative Manifesto Project. Similarly to classic content analysis, coders analyse and score a text on the basis of 
coding rules. The key diﬀerence between classic content analysis and crowdsourcing is that coding is not done by 
experts in political text analysis but by an online crowd. Another key diﬀerence is that no text is coded by the same 
group of coders since textual units are randomly made available to an enormous pool of coders. The final party score 
is then obtained via an ‘average of averages’ approach. Each unit of text receives an ideological score which is an 
average of the scores from five online coders that were assigned to each text on average.
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 The political party score is 
then the average score of the texts tabled by members of the relevant political party.  
Over traditional hand-coding methods, crowdsourcing has the advantage of scale reliability, guaranteed by the 
‘average of averages’ approach, as well as that of replicability (Benoit et al., 2016). Benoit et al. (2016) found that 
text analysis by coders on the web highly correlates with the results from experts and that this holds for both 
electoral manifesto and legislative text data. The method is therefore successful in approximating experts’ hand 
coding because it relies on multiple coders per text (the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ eﬀect) and because the online 
platform used (Crowd Flower) allows the researcher to set a series of quality checks, such as initial quizzes and 
random administration of test questions throughout the job. The researcher, via these quality checks, can easily filter 
out ‘spammers’ (Benoit et al., 2016; Berinsky et al., 2012). For more details on the quality checks used to filter out 
rogue online coders, and on the ‘average of averages’ procedure to extract the final ideological score of political 
parties, see the Online appendix.  
The scaling codebook built for this job covers both economic and social policy areas, e.g. economic regulation, 
trade, foreign policy and security, individual rights, religion and immigration. Domain-specific ideological scales 
were built on the basis of Bobbio’s (1996) conceptualisation of the left–right domain, and of Benoit and Laver’s 
(2006) ideological codebook. The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ never appeared in the codebook, given their heavily loaded 
and context-dependent meanings (Benoit and Laver, 2006). To approximate scale equivalence, the ideological scales 
created for crowdsourcing closely follow the economic policy items of the European Election Survey 2009 and use a 
five-point Likert scale. For example, for the Economy, Environment, Business and Agriculture/Fisheries policy 
domain, the scale went from extreme economic freedom (unconditional privatisation, no taxation, no regulations, no 
public spending) to extreme economic regulation (state ownership, high taxation, high state regulation and strong 
welfare state provisions). The full crowdsourcing codebook is available in the Online appendix.  
The complete corpus of EP7 written parliamentary questions consists of 55,623 texts, scraped from the EP oﬃcial 
website. To reduce costs, I sampled only written questions that had a probability of over 0.59 of being on economic, 
environmental, social and foreign policy topics. In addition, texts with probability < 0.59 of con-taining left–right 
statements were filtered out. This was achieved through the Naïve Bayes text classification algorithm. The algorithm 
was trained on a random selection of pre-classified texts to categorise the entire corpus by policy domain and by 
frequency of ideologically charged language (see the Online appendix for details). This ‘socio-economic-
ideological’ subset of the corpus totalled 31,099 texts (14,248 economic, 8782 environmental, 6845 on foreign and 
trade policy and 1224 on personal and civil rights), or 56% of the original corpus. Although not relying on random 
selection, the size of the purposive sample is very large. This purposive sampling strategy was adopted to ensure that 
‘not applicable’ answers by coders be reduced to a minimum.  
A maximum of 13 texts per MEP were then randomly sampled from this ‘socio-economic ideological’ subset. 
This results in bigger political parties having more units of texts than smaller parties. This mimics the voter survey, 
in which big parties enjoy a higher number of respondents. This sampling choice avoids the problem of over-pro-
ductive MEPs biasing the final party score, since each party MEP contributes at most 13 written questions to the 
party sample. The textual data uploaded online for text analysis amounted to 6940 units or 12.5% of the original 
corpus. Each text contained information on the MEP, the EP party group and the date of submission. Information on 
MEPs, dates and political groups was removed before uploading the data online. These 6940 texts were uploaded to 
Crowd Flower as tasks for the online coders.  
Party voters were scaled using the EES 2009. Four attitudinal survey items are of particular interest and 
specifically, the economic sub-items of the following question: 
 
Now I will read out some statements to you. For each of the following statements, please tell me to what degree you agree 
or disagree with each statement: 
 
. Private enterprise is the best way to solve [country name]’s economic problems 
. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership 
. Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy 
. Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people 
 
The items are all measured in a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). They were 
recoded to ensure that higher values were associated with right-wing attitudes. Sub-items one, two and four were all 
found to load positively into a principal latent factor interpretable as the economic policy domain and were thus 
aggregated into an additive index of economic ideology (see the Online appendix for details).  
Since political representatives are scaled via text analysis and voters via survey answers, the question arises as to 
whether the two scales are comparable. The analysis adopts several precautions to ensure that basic metric and 
indicator equivalence are met. First, it scales parties and voters on the basis of a standardised codebook and 
questionnaire. Second, the same units of measurement of the voter survey were imposed on the text analysis 
codebook. Third, scores were the result of aggregation of multiple indicators of economic policy preferences. 
Fourth, a relatively ‘low-stakes’ legislative activity was used, which could be argued approximates the choice 
situation faced by respondents when putting their policy preferences on record on a survey. 
 
EP written questions were chosen as they are unobtrusive measures of political parties’ ideologies. When 
compared to other ‘input’ activities
3
 (speeches, written declarations, motions, questions for question time and oral 
questions), they were found to be authored by all MEPs and thus to be more representative of the EP chamber. They 
were also found to have comparatively lower procedural constraints. They can be tabled by individual MEPs who 
can draft as many as needed and do not require notice periods. The responsibility for their contents lies with the 
individual MEP; the President has the mere administrative function of delivering them to the appropriate 
Commission’s Directorate General (DG) or Council configuration. The Commission and the Council are obliged to 
answer written questions (European Parliament, 2010: Rule 117), and they indeed answered over 98% of them in the 
2009–2014 period. Written questions are published online but are not televised, and hence are relatively less visible. 
There are fewer barriers in tabling a written question and MEPs can freely put their policy preferences on record 
there. Text analysis of EP7 written questions and a survey to EP8 MEPs and Commission civil servants highlight 
that MEPs consistently put their policy preferences on record in written questions.
4
 Written parliamentary questions’ 
‘choice situation’ is most similar, among other legislative activities, to putting policy preferences on record in a 
survey. Aiming at a similarity of choice situation between representatives and voters is key to approximate the 
indicator equivalence requirement (Lewis and Tausanovitch, 2015; Matsusaka, 2001). When voting in roll call 
votes, representatives face substantially diﬀerent choice situations than voters: estimating parties’ positions with roll 
call votes is therefore discouraged to study political representation (Lewis and Tausanovitch, 2015). In addition, roll 
call votes in the EP are not a random sample of the entire population of legislative votes and might lead to biased 
inferences (Hug, 2009). Because of their representativeness and low constraints, written parliamentary questions 
were chosen to measure political parties’ positions during the input stages of decision-making over EU economic 
policies. 
To the extent that parties’ and voters’ scales are used diﬀerently, these diﬀerences are expected to be spread 
uniformly across parties. There is no evidence that online coders used the ideological scale diﬀerently from EES 
2009 respondents. The middle category was not chosen more often by crowd coders than the other categories. The 
centre-left value was actually the top category, being chosen 41% of the time, while the middle category only 17% 
of the times and the extremes roughly 12% of the time. Similarly, EES 2009 respondents chose the middle category 
in the redistribution, private enterprise and public services survey items roughly 17% of the time and the extremes 
(scores ‘1’ and ‘5’) roughly 14% of the time. The same ‘scoring’ procedure was applied uniformly to all political 
parties: problems of indicator equivalence can be treated as instrument error. The conclusions drawn here are thus 
expected to be valid and not to be biased against specific political parties. 
 
Majoritarianism or pluralism? Political representation in policy inputs from the EP 
 
The analysis groups 2009 voters and EP7 MEPs by national party. Over 160 national parties served in the EP7. 
Because of data availability (only national parties with five EES 2009 respondents or with five written questions or 
more 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
were retained) roughly 120 political parties are part of the following analyses. All European Party Groups (EPGs) 
serving in the EP7 are represented in the dataset as well as 25 countries out of 27.
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The operationalisation of behavioural congruence relies on measures of distance between preferences of 
representatives and voters’ policy preferences. Two main types of measures are adopted in the literature: distance 
measures based on central tendency and distance measures taking into account distribution spread (Achen, 1978; 
Golder and Stramsky, 2010). Political representation can be evaluated at three levels: (1) at the individual 
representative level, where the ideological score of a single political representative is compared to his/her 
constituency ideological scores (dyadic representation); (2) at the party level, where the ideological score of a 
political party is compared to its constituency ideological scores (collective representation); (3) at the legislature or 
institutional level, which assesses the average performance of parties or of individual representatives 
(legislative/institutional representation). These measures are summarised in Table 1. To describe the representation 
performance of the EP the latter (institutional representation) measures are appropriate here and will be adopted in 
the descriptive analysis below. 
Parties’ and voters’ scores in economic policy are compared first by means of a bivariate regression (Table 2), 
and second by means of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) comparison (Figure 1).  
The regression slope indicates that the relationship between 2009 voters and EP7 parties is statistically 
significantly diﬀerent than zero and positive, meaning that EP political parties do represent their average party 
voters when tabling written questions. However, the association is far from the ideal 1:1 relationship. For each unit 
move to the right of the average party voter, EP7 national parties only move 0.21 of a Likert scale unit.  
Figure 1 presents the results from the distribution-based measure of congruence. The significance of the 
diﬀerence between voters’ and parties’ CDFs is tested 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
via the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Golder and Stramsky, 2010). The evidence indicates that average party voters are 
roughly well represented in the EP. The two distributions are, however, statistically significantly diﬀerent. The two 
points of the curve where there is a lack of overlap are the left-of-centre and the right-wing sections. Figure 1 
indicates that there are more political parties in the section slightly left of centre than there are party voters, and that 
there are more voters in the right-wing section than there are parties. The average position of European voters 
(slightly left of centre) is therefore over-represented by political parties ser-ving in the EP7. The clustering of EP7 
parties in the ideological position of the average European voter seems to be mostly at the expense of right-wingers, 
which is somewhat at odds with the hypotheses of the social-democratic critique, which assumes that right-wing 
economic preferences (pro-business and anti-regulation) are the prerogative of the upper classes. 
The descriptive results – both from central-tendency and distribution-based operationalisations of political 
representation – show that EP7 political parties cluster around the average European voter position, and that mild 
congruence to average party supporters is also present. EP7 political parties seem to strongly abide by the 
majoritarian rule and to only mildly abide by the norm of pluralism. The latter would, however, be normatively more 
appropriate for the input stages of the policy cycle (Dahl, 1989). That commitment to the ‘responsible party model’ 
is weak in EP7 input legislative activities is therefore concerning. The following section will further investigate the 
patterns that emerged from the descriptive analysis, as well as the extent to which voter information asymmetries 
and/or social class membership impact the congruence of EP7 political parties. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Explanatory analysis: Causes of the variation in behavioural congruence 
 
Behavioural incongruence is the distance between the individual party voter economic preference on the left–right 
scale and the economic preference of the national party she voted for in the 2009 EP elections. Key independent 
variables are the individual party voter’s distance from the average party voter and her distance from the average 
EES 2009 respondents. The political agency model and the EU-specific political contestation hypothesis will be 
tested by the variables Second-order voting, Exposure to the EP campaign and EU knowledge. The social-
democratic critique will be tested by self-reported EES 2009 item social class. Control variables include voter age, 
gender, education and Euro-scepticism. For descriptions and summary statistics of all covariates, see the Online 
appendix. The data on the covariates were collected from the Voter European Election Study 2009. 
Due to the hierarchical nature of the data – voters clustered within parties and within countries – a multilevel 
regression model was fitted to the data to control for dependencies and possible unexplained party and country 
eﬀects. The regression diagnostics reveal that residuals are approximately normal and symmetric. The 
heteroskedasticity of the error term is taken care of by fitting a multi-level model with national parties and member 
states as clusters. 
 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results on the two main independent variables confirm the results from the descriptive analysis. The 
regression analysis in Table 3 demonstrates that an individual voter that is one Likert scale unit more distant from 
the average party voter is only 0.13 units more distant from her national party, but that an individual voter that is one 
Likert scale unit more distant from the average European is 0.84 units more distant from her national party. The 
latter finding confirms the move of political parties towards the position of the average European voter, highlighted 
already by the distribution of parties’ and voters’ ideological scales. The eﬀect of voter ‘extremism’ – or of the 
individual voter’s distance from the average EES 2009 respondent – has a stronger eﬀect on congruence than 
distance from the average party voter. Including distance from the average European substantially decreases the 
eﬀect of average party voters (from 0.82 to 0.13) and substantially improves the model (Log likelihood increase: 
4108.8, v
2
: 7735.77, p-value: 0.000). This confirms that political parties in the EP7 are congruent with their average 
party voter but, similarly to political parties in traditional representative democracies, also feel the pressure to 
respond to the average citizen. The comparison of the nested with the full model highlights that this ‘push’ towards 
the average European is what mostly lies behind the ‘pull’ away from the average party voter. The consensual nature 
of EP decision-making might be the particular mechanism behind this finding since the proportional electoral rules 
adopted in EP elections as well as their second-order nature are not strong incentives to pander to the median voter. 
Another explanation lies in the ‘double-constituency’ structure of party politics in the EP: national parties are 
usually aﬃliated with bigger EPGs when working in the EP. These groups work as ‘umbrella’ organisations and 
have the power to allocate committees and speaking time, for example (Kreppel, 2002). EPG leaderships may thus 
have a moderating influence on the component parties, and the necessity to cater to the EPG common ideology 
might also be the reason behind the findings. Another reason might be the particular period studied. The analysis is, 
in fact, limited to the 2009–2014 period. This legislative term is peculiar, as it followed the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis. As recent studies have demonstrated (Blumenau and Lauderdale, forthcoming; Otjes and Van Der 
Veer, 2016) legislative behaviour in economic policy changed in the EP7, in response to the 2008 crisis. In 
particular, left–right voting patterns diminished in the economic policy domain, while the pro/anti EU dimension 
gained salience. 
Moving to the political contestation and the social democratic critiques to EU democracy, the regression results 
confirm hypotheses 1 and 2, while they do not confirm hypotheses 3 and 4. Keeping constant the voter distance from 
both the average party voter and the average European, voters that closely follow the EP election campaign can 
expect to pull the political party closer to their own policy preferences. The eﬀect is, however, small: a standard 
deviation increase in exposure to the EP campaign decreases incongruence by 0.006 of a Likert scale unit. The 
reduction in party incongruence for a completely uninvolved versus a completely involved voter is of just 0.04 of a 
Likert scale unit. Voters that in the 2009 election selected a diﬀerent party than in the previous national election, as 
well as a diﬀerent one than they would normally vote, are on average 0.02 Likert scale units more incongruent with 
their parties than first-order voters, all else constant.  
There is evidence that, after controlling for their distance from the average party voter and the average European, 
‘first-order’ voters and highly engaged voters are more successful in pulling the party towards their policy 
preferences. This is important and it shows that even in the hyper-consensual legislature of the EU competent 
voting, campaign-specific information and engagement give individuals an advantage in political representation. 
This confirms the political agency model and the political contestation critique of EU democracy. The analysis also 
reveals, however, that general knowledge of the EU does not lead to a reduction in incongruence. Assuming that 
political knowledge survey items indeed proxy one’s deep knowledge of EU decision-making (Lupia, 2015), it 
appears that more knowledgeable voters are not more congruent with their parties. If anything, voters with a low-to-
medium knowledge are more incongruent than voters with no knowledge at all. The rejection of hypothesis 3 is 
inconsistent with rational choice accounts of political representation. 
Moving to hypothesis 4, there is no evidence from the data that the social-democratic critique has any validity as 
far as the EP is concerned. The preferences of working class respondents, controlling for their distance from the 
aver-age party voter and the average European, and controlling for political knowledge, engagement and second-
order voting are not more likely to be ignored. Contrary to the social-democratic critique, the data even show that 
middle and upper middle class voters suﬀer, respectively, 0.01 and 0.03 Likert scale units more incongruence by 
their party when compared with working class voters. However, the other social classes are not diﬀerent from the 
working classes in congruence levels, so no evidence consistent with a systematic pro-working class bias was found 
either. 
Concerning control variables, voter age and education are not statistically sig-nificantly associated with 
behavioural congruence. Female voters are 0.01 Likert scale units less distant from their party than male voters. This 
is surprising and might be explained by gender diﬀerences in ideological leanings and voting behaviour. As far as 
voter Euro-scepticism is concerned, the data reveal that, keeping all else constant, voters who agree that membership 
in the EU is a good thing (maximum europhilia) suﬀer 0.02 units higher incongruence than voters who think 
membership is a bad thing. This result may be explained by a stronger pre-disposition of Euro-sceptic voters to hold 
EU politicians to account, but additional evidence is required to explain this particular finding.  
All in all, the evidence points to the correct functioning of substantive represen-tation in the EP as far as 
majoritarian democratic norms are concerned. However, pluralism is deemed more appropriate in ‘inputs’ to the 
policy cycle (Bellamy, 2010; Dahl, 1989). Written parliamentary questions hardly represent the adoption or final 
stages of decision-making. Therefore, a greater sensitivity to average party supporters as opposed to the average 
European voter should be expected for this type of legislative activity. The requirement of pluralism failed in EP 
inputs to decision-making in economic policy. This is cause for concern, since certain economic interests do not 
even have the chance to be presented at the input stage. It appears that when political parties breach the ‘responsible 
party model’ requirement in economic written parliamentary questions, they do so to favour the preferences of the 
average European and – albeit slightly – to favour ‘first-order’ and more campaign-aware voters. Majoritarianism 




The article’s objective was to investigate the hypotheses that political parties serving in the EP are incongruent with 
European voters’ preferences in economic policy due to failures in EU political contestation and that they are 
particularly insensitive towards the interests of lower class voters. To this end, it compared party voters and parties’ 
left–right positions in economic policy. Parties’ positions were retrieved from written parliamentary questions to the 
EU Commission and to the Council tabled between 2009 and 2014, via the state-of-the art content analytic method 
of crowdsourcing. Voters’ positions were collected from the European Election 2009 Voter Study. 
The article is innovative because of its assessment of ‘substantive’ legislative activities rather than the more 
‘formalistic’ manifesto pledges or election survey responses. The investigation of representation during the policy 
cycle was facilitated by the introduction of crowdsourcing as a method of political text analysis. This project applies 
this new and flexible procedure of text analysis to a real-world political problem, establishing a procedure that can 
be easily replicated to assess representative democracies worldwide. The study has implications for the political 
contestation and the social-democratic critiques to EU democracy. It tackles the Euro-sceptic perception of EU 
institutions as unrepresentative, as well as scepticism concerning supranational democracy in general. 
 
The analysis finds good institutional representation of the position of the aver-age European voter by the EP but 
low pluralism. Political parties are, in fact, only mildly aligned to their respective average supporter once the 
position of the average European voter is controlled for. Political parties in the EP7, similarly to political parties in 
other traditional representative democracies, are drawn towards the aver-age citizen, even in the ‘input’ stages of the 
policy cycle, whose ‘lower stakes’ should facilitate attention to party supporters. Given the flaws of EP elections, 
this finding cannot be explained by electoral incentives. It might however be explained by the strong consensual 
norms of EU decision-making or by the presence at EP level of partisan umbrella organisations: the EPGs. Low 
pluralism in the input stages of the policy cycle, however, could have important legitimacy repercussions and might 
be fuelling Euro-sceptic and populist rhetoric.  
The data support the ‘political contestation’ hypothesis that second-order voting hurts political representation: the 
economic preferences of second-order voters are, in fact, under-represented. Also, the results highlight that 
campaign engagement and awareness can help in reducing behavioural incongruence. As far as the social-demo-
cratic critique to the EU, the study does not find any bias against working classes, instead it finds some 
incongruence with right-wing voters and wealthier voters.  
The article has some limitations. First, it tests substantive representation at the level of economic policy only. The 
economic policy domain was chosen, however, because of its salience in EU decision-making and the priority 2009 
voters gave to economic topics. To the question ‘what is the top priority in your country today’, 69% of EES 2009 
respondents answered with an economic issue. Since EU decision-making is mostly focused on economic policy, 
with 61% of Commission DGs and 48% of EP committees dedicated to economic policy domains, the assessment of 
substantive representation in the economic policy domain is clearly fundamental. However, caution is needed in 
generalising the findings to other policy areas. Future research would need to consider those additional dimensions 
of political competition: it might be that the eﬀect of second-order voting or campaign aware-ness was marginal in 
this well-known policy domain, but would be crucial in other domains where domestic heuristics are less helpful.  
Second, the article tests political representation by specifically looking at written parliamentary questions. More 
consequential stages of the EU policy cycle, such as policy adoption or final policy outputs, are not investigated 
here. The analysis of ‘policy inputs’ is considered by some normative theorists to be fundamental in assessing 
democratic deficits (Bellamy, 2010; Dahl, 1989; Goodin, 2003). Future research needs to investigate final policy 
outputs as well.  
Third, the analysis is limited to the 2009–2014 period. As argued above, due to the documented drop in salience 
of the traditional left–right domain in EP activities, the move towards the average European voter documented here 
might have been less conspicuous if other time periods were analysed. Written parliamentary questions are not 
legislative votes: they are part of legislative inputs and MEPs are free to express their unconstrained individual 
positions in written parliamentary questions. Being less consequential and more ‘personal’ than legislative votes, 
political parties should not – in theory – be overly concerned about written questions’ eﬀects on the economy. 
However, the possibility that even this ‘freer’ legislative activity was impacted by the Eurozone crisis cannot be 
discounted. While future research needs to investigate additional legislative terms to test the robust-ness of these 
results, assessing political representation after an economic crisis is even more vital. It is especially in testing times 
that political inputs should guarantee good political representation. This ‘crucial’ test was successful in the EP (as 
far as majoritarianism is concerned), while the same cannot be said of other advanced representative democracies 
(Aaldering, 2016; Bartels, 2008; Gilens and Page, 2014). 
Fourth, indicator equivalence is not fully guaranteed here, since studies of substantive representation, by their 
nature, have to compare two diﬀerent choice situations and instruments: legislative activities against survey answers. 
The section on ideological scaling outlined the precautions taken to ensure the voter and party scales could be 
compared. In particular, political parties were carefully scaled via a standardised content analysis procedure, that the 
choice situations facing respondents and party members were similar, that economic policy preferences were 
aggregated into a core economic dimension and that a common five-point Likert metric was imposed on the two 
scales. It is consequently reasonable to conclude that the basic requirements of metric equivalence and choice 
situation equivalence were satisfactorily approximated here. Potential diﬀerential item functioning is treated here as 
instrumental error, uniformly distributed across political parties. It is not expected to bias the results from the 
analyses. 
This study is valuable in that it shows that there is no democratic deficit (as far as the majoritarian norm is 
concerned), or pro-capital bias in EP written questions on economic policy. It indicates further that informed voters 
do incentivise politicians to be congruent: second-order voting and scarce exposure to EP campaigns are thus 
shortcomings of EP elections that need to be redressed. More broadly, it provides further evidence in support of the 
political agency model: to ensure that representative democracies fulfil basic democratic requirements, reforms 
should focus on countering information asymmetries and promoting competent voting. The evidence of low plur-
alism in ‘input stage’ activities, such as written parliamentary questions, is, however, troubling. Pluralism – or the 
abidingness to the ‘responsible party model’ in this case – is considered essential in the input stages of the policy 
cycle. Low pluralism could be one of the reasons for the floundering public support for the European project; as 
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1. Massimo Fini at the V_day: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼mcpmzZSdDNU.  
2. For the coding of EP7 written parliamentary questions, only 13 were coded by less than five coders. No text was coded by less 
than three coders. The wide majority of texts (3978) was coded by six or more coders. The explanation concerning the 
adequate number of coders per text can be found in the Online appendix.  
3. Author’s own study. Available upon request.  
4. Author’s own study. Available upon request.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Measures of Political Representation.   
 Central-tendency Congruence Distributional Congruence 
Dyadic 𝑟𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗 1 −
∑ | ?̅?𝑗 − 𝑣𝑗𝑖|
∑ |𝑟𝑗 −𝑣𝑗𝑖|
 
   
Collective ?̅?𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗 1 −
∑ | ?̅?𝑗 − 𝑣𝑗𝑖|
∑ |𝑝?̅? −𝑣𝑗𝑖|
 




𝑝?̅? = α + β?̅?𝑗 
∑|𝑐𝑑𝑓𝑟 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓𝑣| 
or 
∑|𝑐𝑑𝑓𝑝 − 𝑐𝑑𝑓𝑣| 
Note: 
p = party(ies) 
r= representative(s) 
v = voters 
 
 
Table 2. OLS Regression of parties’ average economic policy score (as expressed in legislative activities of the input 
stage) on party voters’ average economic policy scores.  
EP7 Parties’ Behavioural Congruence 
 National Parties’ 
Economic Conservatism 
Voters’ Economic Conservatism 0.21 (0.06)*** 
  
Intercept 2.05 (0.16)*** 
R2 0.11 
N 120 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Figure 1. Cumulative distribution functions of party voters’ and EP7 parties’ ideology in 
economic policy.  
 
Distributional Distance  0.298*** 
Note:  
Statistical significance of cdfs difference obtained by means of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
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Table 3. Multilevel OLS regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Voter Distance from Average Party Voter  0.821 (0.00846)*** 0.130 (0.00795)*** 
    
Voter Extremism  -- 0.842 (0.00722)*** 
    
Voter Exposure to EP election campaign  0.00559 (0.00152)*** -0.00226 (0.000958)* 
    
Second Order Voter  0.0284 (0.0154) 0.0253 (0.00971)** 
    
Voter Europhilia  -0.00235 (0.00678) 0.00961 (0.00426)* 
    
EU Knowledge – 1 correct  -0.00464 (0.0167) 0.0125 (0.0104) 
EU Knowledge – 2 correct  0.0276 (0.0158) 0.0227 (0.00993)* 
EU Knowledge – 3 correct  0.0360 (0.0158)* 0.0155 (0.00988) 
EU Knowledge – 4 correct  0.0567 (0.0168)*** 0.0188 (0.0106) 
    
Lower Middle Class Voter  -0.00351 (0.0135) -0.00356 (0.00845) 
Middle Class Voter  0.0207 (0.0103)* 0.0139 (0.00649)* 
Upper Middle Class Voter  0.0711 (0.0148)*** 0.0334 (0.00926)*** 
Upper Class Voter  0.0553 (0.0317) 0.0102 (0.0199) 
    
Secondary Education  -0.00873 (0.0105) -0.00269 (0.00658) 
Tertiary Education  0.00778 (0.0109) 0.00755 (0.00686) 
    
Voter Age  -0.000001 (0.000009) 0.000001 (0.000005) 
    
Female Voter  -0.0114 (0.00768) -0.00961 (0.00481)* 
    
Intercept 0.674 (0.0176)*** 0.0967 (0.0280)*** 0.0231 (0.0187) 
Intercept Member State -2.750 (0.258)*** -3.465 (0.655)*** -4.385 (2.315) 
Intercept National Party -2.182 (0.0944)*** -2.141 (0.0894)*** -2.242 (0.0805)*** 
Residual Intercept -0.694 (0.00652)*** -1.062 (0.00757)*** -1.531 (0.00757)*** 
N 11874 8844 8844 
Log Likelihood -8720.0 -3279.9 828.9 
AIC 17448.1 6599.8 -1615.8 
BIC 17477.6 6741.6 -1467.0 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
